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NOTES AND COMMENT
statute permitting the lender to place reasonable restrictions on the
use of the vehicle; neither should it be viewed as holding that the
parental liability for allowing an incompetent minor access to a vehicle
or expressly permitting the operation thereof, is solely controlled by
Section 59. The decision must be regarded as an inadvertence of
the true principles involved. The rule must then be viewed as one
not supported by principle or authority and should be repudiated at
the earliest opportunity. Barring this, the effect on the decisional
law in the future may be significant.
KEITH S. SuTroN.
THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTIONS 50 AND 51 OF THE NEW YORK
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW TO WORD PICTURES
Decisions of the state and federal courts have led to some con-
fusion as regards the proper interpretation to be accorded Sections
50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. These sections pro-
vide that any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within
this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without
his written consent, first obtained, may sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use. They also provide for
the granting of injunctive relief and contain a penal element.'
The point in controversy is whether or not the words "portrait"
and "picture" as used in the above sections apply to a word-painting.
Does a graphic description of an individual wherein he is identifiable
by reference to appearance, habits or details of his private life con-
stitute a picture or a portrait within the purview of the act?
This question has never been passed upon either by the state
or federal courts. Statements made by the courts by way of dicta,
however, intimate that such a portraiture published without the con-
sent of the subject would be sufficient to support an action under
this statute.2
Were it not for two circumstances these dicta might be of no
great significance. But the cases construing these statutes are as
yet so few in number that these casual expressions of opinion assume
an importance out of proportion to the weight that would ordinarily
be accorded such statements in a better documented branch of the
law. They are even more significant when considered from the
standpoint of their possible effect in circumscribing the right of the
individual to complete freedom of expression.
IN. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51.2 See Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. C N. Y.
1944) ; Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 57, 103 N. E. 1108, 1110 (1913).
1946 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., the statement is made
that the phrase "portrait or picture" as used in the statute, "...
requires a clear representation of a person whether by photograph,
statue, imitation, or word painting." 3 This statement is unquestion-
ably dictum in the case, which involved a characterization contained
in a motion picture. The decision has, nevertheless, been cited for
this proposition. 4
In Binns v. Vitagraph Co., the court states that "a picture within
the meaning of the statute is not necessarily a photograph of the liv-
ing person, but includes any representation of such person." 5 This
statement, when read out of the context appears to confirm the dic-
tum of the court in the Levey case quoted above.
This conception was first afforded judicial cognizance in the
Roberson case.0 This leading case denied the existence of a right
to privacy under the then existing laws of New York. The follow-
ing statement is made in the course of a general discussion of the
advisability of recognizing such a right: ". . . the right of privacy
once established as a legal doctrine, cannot be confined to the re-
straint of the publication of a likeness, but must necessarily embrace
as well the publication of a word picture, a comment upon one's looks,
conduct, domestic relations, or habits." 7 It is also suggested in "The
Right to Privacy",8 an article of which Justice Brandeis was co-
author, and which directed the attention of legal scholars to this prob-
lem. There it is said: "If you may not reproduce a woman's face
photographically without her consent, how much less should be
tolerated the reproduction of her face, her form, and her actions, by
graphic description coloured to suit a gross and depraved imagina-
tion." 9
If it be conceded that the gravamen of an invasion of one's right
of privacy is an interference with one's right to pass through the
world without being singled out and exposed to the public eye, ex-
cept as one's occupation or mode of life make this impossible, then
it must also be conceded that a description of one's habits or a com-
mentary on one's life will ordinarily be a much more serious invasion
of one's right of privacy than the mere publication of a photograph.
Nevertheless, the contention is made here that no action may be
maintained under Sections 50 and 51 by an individual injured by
the publication of a word portrait, for it is apparent on consideration
3 Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 40, 42 (1944).
4 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Annotated, Book 8, pocket
part, p. 51.
5 Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 57, 103 N. E. 1108, 1110 (1914).6Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(1902).
,Id. at 545.8 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 HARV. L. REv. 193.
9 Id. at 214.
[ VOL. 21
NOTES AND COMMENT
of the history of the statutes that it was not the intent of the legis-
lature to give any such right of action.
In 1890, The Right to Privacy, by Warren and Brandeis, ap-
peared in the Harvard Law Review. It called attention to the prob-
lem of those, whose right to be let alone had been violated, with
special reference to the activities of sensational journalists. The
authors concluded that there was sufficient basis in the common law
for the courts to enforce the right of the individual to protection
from the prying eyes of society. While conceding that the right of
privacy does not extend to the publication of matters of general in-
terest, they urged that the right should include not only the use of
an individual's name or picture, but should protect him against the
publication of graphic descriptions as well.
In 1902 the Court of Appeals was presented with the issue of
the existence of a right of privacy in the Roberson case.' 0 In that
case, the defendant used photographs of a child, without obtaining
consent to do so, in connection with an advertisement of a brand of
flour. These portraits were displayed in stores, warehouses, saloons,
and other public places to the humiliation and distress of the plain-
tiff. Whereupon an action was brought to enjoin the defendant from
so using the plaintiff's portrait. In ruling in favor of the defendant,
the Court of Appeals referred to the Warren and Brandeis article,
but specifically rejected the contentions made there respecting word
paintings and graphic descriptions." The Court felt that a vast field
of unnecssary litigation would be opened up by the establishment of
an unlimited right of privacy. The court did, however, invite action
by the legislature to create a restricted right which would correct
the situation presented in the Roberson case. The decision in this
case aroused a storm of public protest.12
Directly thereafter the legislature enacted the statute which is
now embodied in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law. There
can be little doubt that the passage of this statute was in response
to the suggestion made by Judge Bartlett in the Roberson case.' 3
In view of the fact that Judge Bartlett referred at some length to
the Warren and Brandeis article, it seems likely that the framers of
the statute had that article before them as well. Under these cir-
cumstances it is striking that the legislators followed the text of Judge
Bartlett's suggestion almost verbatim. Judge Bartlett cautioned
against a future statute which would make the non-consensual pub-
lication of a graphic description of an individual violative of his right
20 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(1902).
'ld. at 545.
12 O'Brien, The Right of Privacy (1902) 2 CoL. L. Rv. 438 (written by
a member of the court in defense of the decision in the Roberson case).
13 See Rhodes v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 227, 85 N. E.
1097, 1098 (1908).
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of privacy.14  The conclusion is almost inescapable that the legisla-
ture intended to do likewise.
Since the passage of the act the courts have been in substantial
agreement that the statute must be strictly construed due to its penal
character,' 5 and have recognized the fact that the intent of the legis-
lature was only to provide relief in cases of a type similar to the
Robersoi case.16 If this is so then the rule of strict construction
would preclude the extension of the statute to a situation not clearly
within the legislative intent.
Even assuming that it were proper to interpret the statute as
being applicable to word paintings there are practical considerations
which render such an interpretation inadvisable. Warren and
Brandeis in their article in the Harvard Law Review recognized the
fact that the most frequent intruders on the privacy of individuals
were the newspapers. That is as true today as it was then. It is
common knowledge that certain newspapers habitually exploit the
intimate details of rape, divorce, and marital scandal, in order to
appeal to those persons for whom such sordidities have a morbid
attraction. Yet under the present decisions, newspapers and maga-
zines are specifically exempted from the operation of the statute.1 7
On whom then would the burden of liability fall if an identifiable
word picture becomes actionable? Seemingly it would fall squarely
on authors, playwrights, and publishers. Writers ordinarily are en-
gaged in the presentation and interpretation of the action and re-
actions of real persons. Their characters may be synthesized from
the characters of many human beings but in general are a reflection
of the author's impressions of people with whom he has come in
contact.' 8  It is quite true that occasionally a person may be greatly
embarrassed or humiliated by an identifiable characterization in a
literary work. To date it has been felt that the law of libel afforded
the individual sufficient protection from injuries of this sort. To
further extend this protection to include non-defamatory writings
seems an open invitation to baseless litigation; and would subject
every author to the fear of criminal prosecution at the behest of
every individual who fancied himself identified in some literary Work.
U4 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 545, 64 N. E.
442, 443 (1902).
15 Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 55, 103 N. E. 1108, 1110 (1914);
Humiston v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y.
Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1921).
16 Damron v. Doubleday Doran and Co., Inc., 133 Misc. 302, 303, 231 N. Y.
Supp. 444, 445, aff'd w. o., 226 App. Div. 796, 234 N. Y. Supp. 773 (1st Dep't
1929).
17 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806, 810 (C. C. A. 2d 1902);
also see cases cited in note 15 supra.18 Phillips Brooks, Literature and Life: "Life comes before literature, as
the material comes before the work. The hills are full of marble before the
world blooms with statues."
[ VoL. 21
NOTES AND COMMENT
Some of the tendency of the courts to enlarge the scope of Sec-
tions 50 and 51 may be due to a confusion of terms. These statutes
are ordinarily referred to as the "right of privacy" statutes. The
same phrase is used by legal writers and by the courts of other states
to define a very broad personal right, only partially recognized in
most jurisdictions.' 9 Of this extensive right the New York statutes
recognize only a small part.
It may be that public policy as influenced by changing social
conditions necessitates the adoption of an unlimited right of privacy
into the body of our laws. Until such time as the legislature sees
fit to effect such a result our courts are bound to stay within the
rigid confines of the statute as it now exists.
C. E. KLEINBERG.
WHEN IS MALPRACTICE BY A PHYSICIAN ACTIONABLE?
The cases interpreting the New York Statute of Limitation rela-
tive to malpractice actions 1 have proceeded in two main channels that
are completely contradictory in their socio-legal philosophy.
One line of adjudication, determining the persons to whom the
act refers, has narrowed it exclusively to practitioners of medicine,
making the relationship between doctor and patient the salient point
of application of this statute. The second line of interpretation, mark-
ing the accrual of the cause of action, has tended to lessen the chance
of recovery by the patient for a doctor's negligence.
Malpractice has been quite forthrightly defined by the Court of
Appeals. In a case where the defendants, public accountants, pleaded
this statute as an affirmative defense against an action for negligently
false accountings, the court said, "Section 50, subdivision 1, of the
Civil Practice Act, in so far as it prescribes a limitation in actions to
recover damages for malpractice, refers to actions to recover damages
for personal injuries resulting from the misconduct of physicians, sur-
geons and others practicing a profession similar to those enumerated." 2
19 Nizer, The Right of Privacy (1941) 39 MicH. L. REv. 526; Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905); Kunz v.
Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App.
652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91
(1931) (relief granted on grounds of constitutional guaranty); (1896) 31
L. R. A. 283; 18 Ann. Cas. 1017.
IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 50. "Actions To Be Commenced Within Two
Years. The following actions must be commenced within two years after the
cause of action has accrued: (1) An action to recover damages for assault,
battery, seduction, criminal conversation, false imprisonment, malicious prose-
cution or malpractice."2 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven, 248 N. Y. 517, 518, 162 N. E. 507
(1928).
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